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Land Grabbing and the Axis of  
Political Conflicts: Insights from 
Southwest Cameroon 
Frankline A. Ndi and Simon Batterbury 
Abstract: Large-scale land acquisition (LSLA) by foreign interests is a 
major driver of agrarian change in the productive regions of Africa. Rural 
communities across Southwest Cameroon are experiencing a range of 
political conflicts resulting from LSLA, in which commercial interests are 
threatening local land-use practices and access to land. This paper shows 
that the struggle to maintain or redefine livelihoods generates tension 
between inward competition for and outward contestation of claims to 
land. In Nguti Subdivision, the scene of protests against a particular 
agribusiness company, there is continued debate over ideas about, inter-
ests in, and perceptions of land and tenure. The authors show how top-
down land acquisition marginalises land users, leading to conflicts within 
communities and with the companies involved, and conclude that for an 
agro-project to succeed and avoid major conflicts, dominance by elite 
interests must give way to a more inclusive process. 
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Africa is increasingly attractive for investment, and particularly from the 
latter half of the first decade of the twenty-first century, there has been 
renewed interest in commercialising agricultural land and forests (Ver-
meulen and Cotula 2010). Wealthy African companies and multinational 
investors with roots in the West, China, and the Middle East have 
stepped up their efforts to acquire land for food and biofuel production, 
mining, timber extraction, and even for conservation purposes (Borras 
and Franco 2013; Borras et al. 2011; Scoones et al. 2013; Vermeulen and 
Cotula 2010; Wolford et al. 2013; Zoomers 2010). The acquisition of 
vast tracts of land was also presented as a reaction to a convergence of 
crises centring on food security, rising market shares for biofuel, climate 
change, and finance capital (Borras and Franco 2010). Initially, large-
scale land acquisitions (LSLA) were initiated by powerful foreign actors 
and multinational corporations (Oya 2013; Scoones et al. 2013). It is now 
clear that national governments and local elites are equally actively in-
volved, as facilitators and beneficiaries (Alden Wily 2011, 2012; Baglioni 
and Gibbon 2013; Borras and Franco 2010; Cotula 2013; Kandel 2015; 
Millar 2015; Vermeulen and Cotula 2010). 
Studies suggest that land investors favour countries with weak gov-
ernance systems and suitable physical conditions (Cotula et al. 2014; 
Verma 2014), particularly the post-conflict economies (Millar 2015). If 
Africa is “rising” it is doing so unevenly, and unjustly. Some projects have 
been cancelled or scaled back in the last three years due to a return to a 
less favourable economic climate, but protests against non-consultative 
“land grabs”1 are still newsworthy (Cotula 2013). The control of produc-
tive resources appears more complex and nuanced.  
This article provides some local evidence for the claim that land ac-
quisition threatens local livelihoods and cultural norms. The researchers 
focus on the Herakles Farms (Sithe Global Sustainable Oils Cameroon, 
SGSOC) agro-plantation project in Southwest Cameroon to show how 
local livelihoods are threatened and contested. Working with communi-
ties in Nguti Subdivision, the authors examined the concerns that have 
accompanied LSLA in the region and the proliferation of land-use con-
flicts (Fonjong et al. 2015). They show how an axis of political conflict, 
with socio-economic and cultural implications, has emerged from top-
down LSLA in the region and frequently ignores the voices and interests 
of land users.  
1  The phrase “land grab” has become a catch-all to describe and analyse the current 
explosion of large-scale (trans)national commercial transactions of land (Borras et 
al. 2011). 
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Although similar land acquisitions have been widely studied (an ex-
ample being Kampong Sugar in Cambodia, IDI 2014; see also Hall et al. 
2015), those in Cameroon have largely escaped attention. This study asks 
specifically why the people of Manyemen, Ebanga, and Talangaye con-
test SGSOC’s agro-plantation project and how local communities’ quests 
for additional farmland generate conflict within communities and with 
the agro-company. What effects do new claims to land have on local 
communities’ socio-economic and cultural well-being? What does this 
tell us about new forms of land access and control in contemporary 
Africa and what Ribot and Peluso (2003: 153) call “the ability to derive 
benefits from things,” which may include different and more equitable 
access arrangements? 
This study uses LSLA interchangeably with “land grabbing” in 
recognition of the fact that the debates on the terminology are ongoing 
and contested (see also Doss et al. 2014). Land grabbing is a more ac-
curate term in our case because of the shady nature of the land deals, and 
SGSOC’s inability to respect certain criteria for responsible land invest-
ment and good governance, for example, a lack of proper social and 
environmental impact assessment (see also Ndi 2017). 
Context
Many large land deals in Africa involve a shift to commercial monocul-
tures. Many African governments see foreign land investments as a way 
to enhance agricultural productivity by bringing technological innovation 
and new infrastructure – in principle creating jobs, public revenue, and 
economic development (Cotula et al. 2014; De Schutter 2009; Lisk 2013; 
Neville and Dauvergne 2012; see also Gebresenbet 2016). But there is an 
asymmetrical power relationship in land deals negotiated without the 
consent of (potentially) affected populations (Fairbairn 2013; GRAIN 
2008). In most cases, the assumption that gains will “trickle down” to 
local people, through employment on plantations, outgrower schemes, 
or land-access royalties, is illusory (Anseeuw 2013; O’Brien 2011). It is 
almost certain that the greatest impacts are felt by the poorest: forest-
dependent households, pastoralists, and farmers who are dispossessed 
from semi-subsistence livelihoods and are bypassed by other options (De 
Schutter 2012; Vermeulen and Cotula 2010). 
Research has cautioned that the large-scale acquisition of land, if 
not properly managed and implemented, can threaten the social and 
economic livelihoods of rural agrarian populations and the legal recogni-
tion of customary land-use systems (Zoomers 2010). The former United 
Nations rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter, contended 
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some years ago that LSLA would lead to exclusion, displacement, and 
social fragmentation (De Schutter 2009). Local communities have cer-
tainly experienced these phenomena (Borras and Franco 2013; Hall et al. 
2015; Mamonova 2012; Smalley and Corbera 2012). 
On a global scale, Scoones et al. (2013) have argued that little has 
been done to understand what actually transpires in LSLAs on the 
ground, and few reports offer insight into the overall impacts, whether 
positive or negative. Oya (2013) describes most studies as empirically 
hasty and methodologically prone to shortcuts, urging researchers to 
undertake in-depth qualitative assessments of the socio-economic im-
pacts. Edelman (2013: 490) advocates more “ethnographic or historical 
analyses” in an attempt to discover the “on-the-ground realities” of large 
land deals (see also Millar 2015). Borras and Franco (2013) suggest that 
understanding local people’s political reactions to large land deals re-
quires locating the dynamics in broader agrarian transformation pro-
cesses and analysing the main axis of political conflict. “Conflict” refers 
to contrasting interests, ideas, and perceptions associated with large land 
acquisition that results in contestations and confrontations within com-
munities, and between these communities and the state and/or the in-
vestors. This paper focuses on the drivers and socio-economic and cul-
tural implications of this conflict.  
In accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon, 
all “untitled” land has been controlled and managed by the state since 
the 1970s (Feintrenie et al. 2014; Fonjong et al. 2010). More recently, 
substantial land allocations have been sanctioned by the political regime, 
leading to the displacement of agricultural and forest communities occu-
pying ancestral lands, usually narrowing their options to relocation, 
waged labour, or migration to cities and towns (see Schwartz et al. 2012; 
Greenpeace 2014). Keeping in mind this context, this research first out-
lines theories of land access and how capacities to benefit from land and 
forest resources become constrained and, second, how communities re-
spond to dispossession. The section thereafter provides a brief descrip-
tion of the case, the project, and the methods of data collection. Then, 
the connection between land politics, agribusiness development, and 
land conflicts specific to Cameroon is examined. Following that, the 
authors use a cluster of three villages to analyse the axis of political con-
flicts in Nguti Subdivision, and their sociocultural implications. This is 
followed by a brief discussion and then conclusions. Because land grab-
bing has been found to generate unpredictable responses, the theoretical 
contributions of this research are cautious and tied strongly to the case 
under investigation. 
 Land Grabbing in Southwest Cameroon 37 
Theories of Land Access and the Nature of 
Resistance to Dispossession  
Access to land can be denied or controlled, and this echoes through into 
“access to livelihoods,” which is the prime concern of local people af-
fected by land grabbing (Ribot and Peluso 2003). LSLAs in the tropical 
regions of Cameroon also qualify as examples of “accumulation by dis-
possession” (Harvey 2003). Harvey argues that the expropriation of the 
means of production accompanies capitalist modes of production. His 
extension of “primitive accumulation”2 includes the displacement of 
peasant farmers in favour of large-scale producers; land acquisition’s 
progressive substitution of subsistence mixed cropping for commercial 
cash crops; and the effective privatisation of commonly held and main-
tained land and natural resources. The commercial appropriation of land 
in Cameroon’s tropical regions has been assisted by the state and by 
significant political and socio-economic inequalities. 
Where access to land and forest resources is restricted by accumula-
tion, heterogeneous local communities become spatially constrained and 
struggle to sustain rural livelihoods; they sometimes intensify cropping on 
the land they have, or seek additional land to extend crop production. 
Their claims and demands as well as their interests, attitudes, and re-
sponses towards large land acquisition vary depending on their socio-
economic and political status and gender but revolve around maintaining 
access to sustainable livelihoods, rather than securing “ownership” (Ver-
meulen and Cotula 2010). Competing claims to ownership of parcels of 
land, or even use rights, inevitably provoke conflict. Disputes over bound-
aries, and the erosion of the terms and conditions of legal agreements and 
memorandums of understanding (MoU), are common.  
Theories of peasant resistance also help us to understand both why 
conflict occurs and the sociocultural implications of such conflict. Land 
represents important spiritual and social values, and economic valuations 
cannot capture local feelings or explain the visceral reactions to some 
land deals (Vermeulen and Cotula 2010). Open resistance is less com-
mon among communities without political power or status. It is con-
ducted in different ways subject to their political and economic agency, 
as will be shown, and depending on social structures, strengths, and 
capacities (Moreda 2015; Scott 1987).  
2  Primitive accumulation is elaborated on by Karl Marx in Capital, Volume 1, to 
explain the onset of capitalist accumulation. 
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There are theoretical explanations for societal resistance and the 
movements it gives rise to (Adnan 2007; Das 2007; Isaacman 1990; 
Kerkvliet 2005, 2009; Malseed 2008; Scott 1976, 1985, 1987). Restoring 
socio-economic identities and moral economies, the wellsprings of peas-
ant politics, drive some conflict. Scott shows that “subaltern” people 
belittle dominance and are rarely passive victims of it (Scott 1985: 290). 
Where the morality of “the subsistence ethic” is disrupted, everyday 
resistance (foot-dragging, sabotage, and so on) has political meaning, 
particularly where open resistance is not possible (Scott 1985). Kerkvliet 
defines resistance as  
what people do that shows disgust, anger, indignation or opposi-
tion to what they regard as unjust, unfair, illegal claims on them by 
people in higher, more powerful class and status positions or in-
stitutions. (Kerkvliet 2009: 233)  
People in subordinate positions struggle to affirm their claims “to what 
they believed they are entitled to based on values and rights recognised by 
a significant proportion of other people similar to them” (Kerkvliet 2009).  
Resistance, therefore, consists of the intention to act and the act it-
self. Peasant reactions against exploitation and oppression can be unor-
ganised, individualised, and localised forms of insurgency that “do not 
make headlines” (Moreda 2015: 525). Scott says these forms of peasant 
actions are “real” and part of economic and political struggle by “subor-
dinate classes” (Scott 1985: 292), and that 
the goal, after all, of the great bulk of peasant resistance is not to 
overthrow or transform a system of domination but rather to sur-
vive […] within it. (Scott 1987: 424)  
The debate provides us with clues to understand local actions in Nguti 
Subdivision, where active and passive forms of resistance are still being 
triggered against the Herakles project. 
The Study Region, the Herakles Project, and 
the Research Methods 
The Case: Nguti Subdivision, Southwest Cameroon
Nguti Subdivision is part of the larger Koupé-Manengouba Division in 
Anglophone Southwest Cameroon (Figure 1). It is located along the 
Kumba–Mamfe Highway, which provides access to neighbouring Ni-
geria. Tropical forests are extensive, and rich in biodiversity (Linder 
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2013). There are protected areas and forest reserves of high conservation 
value (HCV) including the Banyang–Mbo Wildlife Sanctuary (69,147 ha), 
the Nguti Council Forest (11,919 ha), and the Bakossi National Park 
(29,320 ha) (H&B Consulting 2011). Farming is the principal local activ-
ity (Nguti Rural Council 2009). Over 80 per cent of this study’s respond-
ents grow food and cash crops, particularly cocoa (Nguti Rural Council 
2009). Local communities also depend on the harvesting of non-timber 
forest products like eru (African jointfir, gnetum africanum).  
The subdivision incorporates three patrilineal clans: the Upper 
Balung, Mbo, and the Bassosi. The Upper Balung clan numbers about 
6,000 people (Achobang et al. 2009). The Mbo, the most remote, live 
around the Banyang Mbo Wildlife Sanctuary, and Chief Tabi Napoleon 
of Baro estimated their population at 15,000 individuals. The Bassosi 
clan is the largest, at around 18,000 people (Nguti Rural Council 2009).  
All three clans have their ancestral lands earmarked for the devel-
opment of agro-plantations sanctioned by the government. It was alleged 
by respondents that one Upper Balung chief masterminded the estab-
lishment of SGSOC in the region, and through his influence, most vil-
lages in the clan have ceded land to this company. The Bassosi villagers 
have refused to allocate land, due to unmet conditions (Ndi 2017). The 
focus here is on the complexities surrounding land in the three Upper 
Balung communities of Manyemen, Ebanga, and Talangaye that have 
already ceded land to SGSOC.  
The Project: Herakles Farms’ (SGSOC’s)
Controversial Oil Palm Project
Herakles Farms is a US company. It is an affiliate of Herakles Capital and 
the parent company of SGSOC (Achobang et al. 2009). On 17 September 
2009, SGSOC signed a land lease with the government of Cameroon to 
establish palm oil plantations in the Southwest Region of the country. The 
company acquired 73,086 hectares of land in the three subdivisions of 
Mundemba, Toko, and Nguti on a 99-year leasehold (see Fonjong et al. 
2015). SGSOC’s Social and Environmental Impact Assessment (SEIA) 
indicated that it would utilise 60,000 hectares of the land for oil palm 
nursery development, palm plantations, and refineries. The remaining land 
would serve as “protected” zones for environmentally or socially sensitive 
resources, plantation infrastructure, and land for village livelihood activities 
(Achobang et al. 2009).  
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Figure 1. Project Location in Southwest Cameroon 
Source: Chandra Jayasuriya, adapted from Greenpeace (2013). 
Although the project promised employment and better living standards, it 
generated controversy from the outset. Local communities (with the sup-
port of national and international environmental advocates) expressed 
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concerns over the project’s possible social, environmental, and economic 
consequences (Nguiffo and Schwartz 2012; Fonjong et al. 2015; Green-
peace 2013, 2014; Nature Cameroon 2011; Oakland Institute 2012). In 
September 2011, critics filed a formal grievance with the Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO),3 citing inadequate environmental assess-
ments and unsupported claims made by SGSOC (Linder 2013). But in 
August 2012, SGSOC withdrew its membership of RSPO, arguing that the 
grievance process was causing delays to its activities (Achobang et al. 2009; 
Linder 2013).  
Perhaps as a response to the numerous contestations and appeals, the 
government of Cameroon passed a decree in November 2013 granting a 
temporary lease of three years and downscaled the company’s concession 
to 19,843 hectares (Nguiffo and Schwartz 2012; Fonjong et al. 2015; 
Schwartz et al. 2012). Despite this decisive move, many people, especially 
those whose livelihoods are directly and indirectly linked to land and forest 
resources, continue to oppose SGSOC’s lease of the land. Those whose 
farmland falls within the reduced concession boundaries still fear losing 
their land to palm oil plantations and ancillary activities.  
In the absence of any formal boundary demarcations, coupled with 
the fact that local communities lack sufficient legal proof to delimit their 
territorial boundaries, the residents of Manyemen, Ebanga, and Talan-
gaye villages find it increasingly difficult to make justifiable claims against 
the agro-company or to determine the limit of their own village lands. 
The authors were told that, in the past, oral histories and natural features 
were used to demarcate approximate territorial limits, but now the 
threats to land access have overrun these boundaries. 
Data Collection Methods
The research was conducted in three villages in Nguti Subdivision whose 
lands were acquired for the development of agro-industrial plantations 
(Figure 2). Focus group discussions, interviews, documentation, and field 
observation took place from March to November 2015. Approximately 50 
interviews were conducted in each village with male and female subsist-
3  RSPO requires that its members or applicants implement a robust FPIC process 
(see page 50) with local communities; refrain from clearing or pressurising HCV 
areas; comply with all national laws in their countries of operation; and publish a 
new planting procedure (NPP) informational document at least 30 days prior to 
planting oil palm or clearing land to make way for planting. SGSOC was unable 
to implement some of these standards and processes, leading to its withdrawal 
(Achobang et al. 2009).  
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ence farmers, small producers, company employees, and hunters and gath-
erers. The languages used were English and Cameroonian Pidgin English.4 
Ten interviews were conducted with the divisional officer (DO), a mayor, 
the subdivision’s delegate of agriculture and his assistant, and NGO per-
sonnel, all of whom were based in Nguti village, the subdivisional head-
quarters. Another two key interviews were conducted in each of the vil-
lages with local chiefs, politicians, and the council of elders. Each interview 
lasted approximately one hour; some were conducted informally because 
of the sensitive nature of LSLA in Cameroon. Two focus group discus-
sions were held in each village: one with women and one with small pro-
ducers and subsistence farmers (mostly men).  
Figure 2. Nguti Subdivision 
Source: Chandra Jayasuriya, adapted from Nguti Rural Council (2009).
Efforts to interview SGSOC representatives were unsuccessful. At the 
time of fieldwork, it was rumoured that the company was experiencing 
financial and managerial crises, and there were criticisms from activist 
organisations and local communities. The company’s doors were shut to 
all researchers, especially those from foreign universities. In some in-
stances, local government interviewees attempted to address some con-
4  Cameroonian Pidgin English is one of many dialects of West African Pidgin 
English used widely in the region, especially among those who are not formally 
educated. 
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cerns on behalf of the company, but the authors were unable to verify 
some of the statements made by interviewees, including accusations 
against the company, which skewed the analysis.  
Interview participants were asked what they knew of the company 
and whether or not they were participating or had participated in 
SGSOC’s activities; if there was any prior consultation; what project 
benefits and challenges have emerged; and what local development pros-
pects there were. Questions were broad to obtain a picture of land-use 
conflicts in the region, but specific to the local communities concerned. 
The authors used notebooks and recordings to compile field data; how-
ever, the majority (70 per cent) of participants did not want their voices 
to be recorded, so most interviews, group discussions and field observa-
tions were handwritten. 
Secondary data was elicited from published and unpublished schol-
arly and technical sources, including reports from national NGOs like 
Nature Cameroon (NC), Struggle to Economize the Future Environ-
ment (SEFE), the Centre for the Environment and for Development 
(Centre pour l’Environnement et le Développement, CED), and interna-
tional organisations including the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), 
Greenpeace, and the World Bank. This assisted the researchers’ under-
standing of land tenure and governance systems, and also the nature and 
dimensions of conflict occurring across rural communities affected by 
LSLA projects.  
Land Politics, Agribusiness Development,  
and Conflict  
In Cameroon, the question of who owns land is contentious because the 
rules governing ownership are implied rather than clearly stated (Sone 
2012). Ordinance No. 74, Section 1, Subsection 2 of 6 July 1974 states, 
The state shall be the guardian of all lands. It may in this capacity 
intervene to ensure rational use of land or in the imperative inter-
est of defence or the economic policies of the Nation.  
This was supported by Decree No. 76/165 of 27 April 1976, which set 
the rules governing land tenure and the processes involved for obtaining 
a land certificate. Government officials representing the state adhere to 
the 1974 ordinance as the only legitimate tool to justify its ownership of 
land that lacks private ownership certificates.  
Section 1 of the ordinance is ambiguous and contradictory. It states 
that “the state guarantees to all natural persons and corporate bodies 
 44 Frankline A. Ndi and Simon Batterbury 
having landed property the right to freely enjoy and dispose of such 
lands” (Ordinance No. 74-1 of 6 July 1974). The meaning of “natural 
persons” and “corporate bodies” is not made explicit; and the statement 
implies that local Cameroonian communities also have ownership, sale, 
and disposal rights. However, in reality this is not the case, because ex-
isting land laws do not fully recognise their customary tenure.  
Attempts by local government to restrict access to land and forest re-
sources tend to contradict the generations-old system of customary land 
access. Administrators often argue that local or indigenous populations 
have the right to use land, but not to own it as property. One senior gov-
ernment official in Nguti Subdivision said in an interview, “Communities 
have the right to use the topsoil, but they cannot claim ownership unless 
they have a land certificate” (18 May 2015). This statement suggests that, 
even with a land certificate, individuals might not have rights to subsurface 
mineral resources.  
Customary tenure institutions recognise land as a collective resource 
that can only be owned by communities or a group of people with a com-
mon lineage. Land belongs to a vast family, including the dead, living, and 
unborn (see Fonjong et al. 2010). Traditional leaders or family heads serve 
as custodians, and allocate land to individuals according to farming, hunt-
ing, and settlement requirements (Baye 2008; Chilver 1963; Sone 2012). 
Authority resides with communities, with local chiefs usually serving as 
land administrators. This keeps local conflict over use rights at a bare 
minimum, since chiefs and elders are regarded as ancestral representatives 
(Mqeke 2003). In addition, land is viewed as a primary source of sus-
tenance, as well as an element of nature (Fisiy 1992; Yanou 2009). It is, and 
was, seen as a conduit through which local communities relate to their 
ancestors socially and culturally, and this interaction has a significant im-
pact on control, ownership, and management (Sone 2012; Yanou 2009).  
The privileges enjoyed by local populations under customary law 
often conflict with legal codes. Subsections 14 and 15 of Ordinance No. 
74, Section 1, 6 July 1974, state that all lands, including those under cus-
tomary tenure without a land certificate, are state-owned irrespective of 
the length of time they were occupied. Since land titles are the only le-
gitimate proof of land ownership, but are too difficult and expensive for 
most local communities to obtain (Fombe et al. 2013), corporations 
(both national and international) are able to automatically invalidate 
customary tenure and render it redundant through existing legal provi-
sions. As Cotula et al. (2016: 24) argue,  
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Overall, this situation leaves the occupants of 90 per cent of the 
land in Cameroon with insecure rights, making them “de facto 
squatters” on their customary lands.  
The insistence on land certificates is further justified and consolidated by 
Decree No. 76/165 of 27 April 1976, which states that “land certificates 
shall be unassailable, inviolable, and final.”  
According to this decree, land concessions are granted to foreign 
individuals or corporations based on certain procedures, terms, and con-
ditions, usually for a period of up to 99 years. In principle, the applicant 
has to submit an application to the minister in charge of land, requesting 
a land parcel. Allocations exceeding 50 hectares require the approval of 
the Cameroonian president. The application should consist of a map of 
the proposed area, a listing of the activities to be carried out, and a pro-
ject development plan (Achobang et al. 2009). Depending on the as-
sessment by the authorities, feasible projects are considered. The gov-
ernment grants land rights in two phases and under certain conditions: 
the first involves a temporary grant for a maximum period of five years; 
and the second is conditional upon the satisfactory implementation of 
the activities planned. Government officials authorised to allocate land 
are specified in the decree granting the lease (Achobang et al. 2009).  
It is important to note that state approval does not guarantee access, 
because communities have frequently resisted or contested proposed 
projects (Vermeulen and Cotula 2010). In practical terms, the land acqui-
sition process ought to incorporate a joint decision between the govern-
ment on the one hand, and local communities on the other (in particular 
land users and “traditional owners”). Agreement is needed on whether 
land should be allocated to investors or new owners, and for what pur-
pose (see Schwartz et al. 2012). Local people and other interested parties 
need opportunities to consent to or challenge proposals. This did not 
happen with the land deal signed in 2009 between the government and 
Herakles. A senior authority in the region noted that this top-down ap-
proach was typical: 
The company’s approach was poor […]. They came with a map 
from Yaoundé, indicating the areas to be acquired [….] [H]aving 
those maps does not guarantee them access […,] my people re-
sisted. We had some agreements with them although many people 
were not involved or consulted. (Interview, 11 May 2015) 
A conventional “top-down” approach to land acquisition has operated 
across many large land deals in Cameroon, often leading to conflict. The 
Herakles negotiations bypassed local land users and “owners,” indicating 
 46 Frankline A. Ndi and Simon Batterbury 
power asymmetry. The state, investors, and local elites at the “top” bene-
fitted directly from the project. Local communities sit far below them 
further “down” on the social ladder (particularly those poor peasant and 
semi-subsistence farmers on traditionally owned land).  
Previous studies in Africa show that local peoples’ passive and ac-
tive resistance can create considerable challenges for investors, persisting 
even where land was legally acquired from the government (Baye 2008). 
In Southwest Cameroon, rural communities that claimed ownership of 
land based on customary tenure contested Herakles’ land deal, claiming it 
was illegal and violated customary use rights.  
The Axis of Political Conflicts
This section shows the different dimensions of conflict generated as a 
result of land acquisition by SGSOC. Local communities without any legal 
proof of ownership of land are in conflict with one another (“horizontal” 
conflicts), and also with the agro-company, which has the support of the 
state and is backed by existing legal provision and a handful of local elites 
and politicians (“vertical” conflicts). The people of Nguti Subdivision alter 
their choice of strategy depending on the socio-economic and political 
context in which they find themselves facing dispossession. The varied 
forms of political conflict instigated by LSLA are now outlined here, with 
particular attention to the conflicts among villages and with the agro-com-
pany. These flow from the SGSOC claim, but are nested within an agrar-
ian system of shifting allegiances and land uses. 
Conflicts between Local Communities and SGSOC  
Encroachment of Forest Land and Destruction of Crops  
Interviewing in Ebanga village, the authors uncovered concerns over 
encroachment. In a letter dated 31 March 2012, the chief of Ebanga 
addressed a complaint to the DO for Nguti, lamenting the widespread 
invasion of Ebanga village farmlands by SGSOC, urging the administra-
tion to intervene. The chief mentioned that SGSOC had sent a letter to 
the village on 20 August 2011, in which the company proposed a “joint 
demarcation of farmlands.” A meeting was intended to settle boundaries 
and avoid future encroachment into land already farmed, but the com-
pany failed to show up. On 12 December 2011, Ebanga village had re-
ceived a second letter. An excerpt reads: 
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We regret that we could not carry out the demarcation exercise as 
planned [… and] we kindly request that you select a number of able 
bodies and knowledgeable men and women in your village who will 
work with SGSOC’s technical team to demarcate areas of current 
farmlands and buffer zones for future village use and sacred sites. 
The marked areas will not be used by the company. (cited in the 
letter written by the chief of Ebanga on 31 March 2012)  
The chief stated in an interview that the village was still waiting, in 2015, 
for this joint exercise to take place. But in the meantime, he said they had 
been surprised to see that SGSOC’s technical team had hammered pillars 
into people’s farmlands and in the forest. He said that the villagers as-
sumed that this meant the company had demarcated its “property,” par-
ticularly as they claimed to have government support. During interviews, 
the authors were informed that Ebanga village is pursuing legal measures 
through the local administration to stop the company from further en-
croachment.  
Some farmers complained of the destruction of crops in those same 
areas. According to them, encroachment and crop destruction without 
compensation is a violation of an agreement made during a meeting 
convened by the DO on 25 September 2009, preceding SGSOC’s estab-
lishment. A clause in the meeting’s minutes states that “the company 
shall provide compensation to persons concerned in case of any destruc-
tion of crops caused by the company.” The impression gained from the 
interviews was that the company has so far refused to acknowledge most 
of the allegations of the destruction of crops and farmland. In the few 
cases where they have acknowledged it, informants said that compensa-
tion has still not been made, although the authors were unable to cor-
roborate this claim with the company. The authors were also told about 
a similar event of crop damage at cocoa farms cultivated by seven 
Manyemen farmers over 76 hectares, with no compensation received at 
the time of the interviews. 
Farming communities from Talangaye also reported crop destruc-
tion and the acquisition of ancestral land, despite the fact that they were 
the first village to be pressured into accepting the presence of SGSOC in 
Nguti Subdivision. Given the active role played by the elites of this vil-
lage in facilitating regional land grabbing, several interviews revealed 
massive dissatisfaction among the members of local communities with 
their elites. Communities generally expect elites to represent their inter-
ests, or to act as “development brokers,” but this was not the case. The 
authors were told that these individuals had put their own interests 
above those of their communities.  
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Invasion and Destruction of Cultural Sites  
Some villagers in the subdivision are also in conflict with SGSOC be-
cause of the company’s inability to recognise and respect cultural sites 
like shrines, graveyards, and sacred groves that are of sociocultural and 
symbolic importance. Interviewees told the authors that in Babensi II 
and Talangaye, SGSOC has invaded and destroyed village shrines and 
forest groves in an attempt to create passages for the extraction and 
transportation of timber, and also for the movement of workers. Com-
munities considered this intrusion into private spaces as taboo, disturb-
ing their relations with ancestors. An elder from Talangaye village stated,  
Our lives also depend on those shrines. When we have problems 
or someone commits a taboo, our kinsmen go into the shrines to 
appease our ancestors. (27 October 2015) 
In addition, interviews revealed that graves had been destroyed. According 
to one respondent, the tampering of the grave of an ancestor, especially by 
an “outsider” or a “foreigner” is an act of violence against the village.  
Unfulfilled Promises Made by the Agro-Plantation Company 
Interviewees said that the MoU signed on 27 July 2010 has not been 
respected in and around all the villages where the company’s plantations 
are established. For example, the company’s promises to provide elec-
tricity and healthcare facilities have never materialised. Field observations 
and discussions with some government officials confirmed this, although 
they made statements suggesting that the company would fulfil all its 
promises in the future. Some participants claimed that, at present, there 
is effectively no valid MoU between the company and their communities 
because SGSOC has defaulted on its side of the agreement. A chief from 
a nearby village who currently resides in Manyemen argued:  
There is no MoU between Manyemen and SGSOC because, the 
company has failed to provide basic social amenities as promised, 
like piped water, electricity, etc. We need to establish new agree-
ments. (13 May 2015) 
Worse still, the villagers (especially farmers) are aggrieved by the com-
pany’s unwillingness to provide compensation for crops destroyed. In-
terviews with seven farmers in Manyemen revealed that the company 
would prefer to take their land and then compensate them because the 
land is located in the middle of its concession. The local government 
authorities, however, countered by saying that the crops were planted 
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after the company had declared its intentions and had earmarked the 
areas as part of their domain. They argued that, at the time of acquisition 
(2009–2010), the land was “empty.” A visit to the contested site in 2015 
confirmed the administrators’ claims. The first author grew up in a simi-
lar farming community and has experience with cash crop farming. He 
was able to examine the stems of the cocoa and banana trees to ascertain 
when they were planted. Normally, it takes between three to five years 
for a cocoa plant to bear cocoa pods; however, none of the cocoa trees 
he examined had fruits. Therefore, it is doubtful that the farmers actually 
planted the crops before 2009. While the farmers may be resisting 
through dissimulation (Scott 1985), adverse land acquisition had clearly 
taken place, causing dispossession and destruction of crops. One of the 
farmers hinted:  
SGSOC struggled to seize our farms, they failed, they tried to buy 
the land, we refused [… so] they went ahead and destroy[ed] our 
crops claiming the land was empty [… and] when we complained, 
they promised compensation yet to be paid. (6 June 2015) 
The authors were told of similar unfulfilled promises in Ebanga where 
crops were also destroyed. Compensation was promised, but not deliv-
ered. Some direct confrontations resulted between the affected people 
and the palm oil plantation workers in 2014. These incidents were un-
common prior to the establishment of the company. 
Criminalisation of Local People  
Interviewees also indicated that local communities whose lands have 
been allocated for agro-industrial plantations are also affected by the 
assertion of power by local chiefs and elites. Villagers are subject to strict 
controls on any activity that might jeopardise the company’s interests. In 
Manyemen, for example, some farmers, speaking anonymously, said that 
company interests were protected by some of their neighbours, who 
were paid to report any actions that seemed contrary to its activities. 
Farmers with destroyed crops are not allowed to resist overtly or to re-
veal information to anyone investigating the company’s activities. They 
did not like to talk in public or where they could be seen, or to be identi-
fied as troublemakers during interviews. Where affected populations 
have tried to complain about company actions, the company has inter-
preted this as a threat to its operations and its workers. The authors 
observed that without any legal backing, the interests of those who have 
the power to influence institutional and administrative frameworks con-
tinue to prevail. One farmer had this to say:  
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SGSOC is trying to make us criminals in our own land. They have 
encroached into my farm […and] mapped out some sections. Be-
cause I have warned them not to trespass, they claim I have threat-
ened them and are trying to criminalise me. How can a foreign 
company intrude into our village and instead of them acting peace-
fully, they rather want us to be victims of their plantation […]? 
(27 October 2015) 
The story is one of intimidation and insecurity. Everyday forms of re-
sistance are common in such situations, such as the planting of crops on 
land earmarked for development, to delay commercial cultivation by 
claiming prior occupancy. While there are always traditional disputes over 
land access, LSLA has magnified and criminalised local assertions of use 
rights and tenure.  
The Sidelining of the Local Population in the  
Land Acquisition Process 
The approach used by SGSOC to acquire land across the Nguti Subdivi-
sion is top-down and elite-based (Fonjong et al. 2015, 2016; Ndi 2017). 
In Manyemen, a farmer contended, 
When SGSOC came into our village, they invited some few elders 
who agreed to give out our forest without our consent… The el-
ders forced us to accept certain conditions, which were later on 
reflected in the MoU. The worst thing is that even the promises 
made in the MoU have not been respected. (8 June 2015)  
The same approach was used in Talangaye and Ebanga. In the agreement 
between the company and Manyemen village, Ebanga was considered part 
of Manyemen. This implied that the people of Ebanga had nothing to say 
or to suggest with respect to deciding whether or not they were willing to 
cede land. This is a clear violation of the principle of free, prior, and in-
formed consent (FPIC),5 which should be central to every LSLA process 
(H&B Consulting 2011). Meanwhile in Talangaye, it was alleged that the 
village head masterminded the arrival of the company for personal gain 
(Etahoben 2014), and expanded his network to convince other smaller 
5  FPIC is formalised through Article 32 of the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples. Its fundamental principle is that indigenous people have 
the right to approve or veto proposed development on their lands, based on full 
information, representative institutions, and iterative, culturally sensitive negotia-
tion, backed up by effective systems of grievance, redress, and mitigation (Col-
chester and Ferrari 2007, cited in Vermeulen and Cotula 2010).  
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villages like Ekita to accept it. However, the authors did not find this vil-
lage head to be in possession of any material incentives from SGSOC.  
Inter-Village Conflicts  
LSLAs provoke additional local conflict, largely invisible in the modern-
ising narrative associated with externally directed monocultures. This 
took place in a cluster of three villages (Manyemen, Ebanga, and Talan-
gaye). Rather than fighting off external requests for land, in this case 
there was a struggle to appropriate land from neighbouring villages to 
then offer to Herakles. Geographically, Ebanga is situated between 
Manyemen to the north and Talangaye to the south. These villages allo-
cated land to Herakles Farms from 2010 onward. The cause of the inter-
village conflict was the quest for royalties, in anticipation that it would be 
paid based on the area ceded. As a result, the three villages struggled to 
acquire patches of land from each other in order to increase their total 
land surface, and to in turn allocate a larger quota to the agro-plantation.  
Manyemen claims to share a common boundary with Talangaye, but 
not with Ebanga (Figure 2). The people of Manyemen argue that Ebanga 
is actually a satellite village of Manyemen. Thus, they want to claim roy-
alties as far as the boundary with Talangaye. This is to some extent an 
“invented” boundary dispute fuelled only by the possibility of economic 
gain, and it is disputed.  
SGSOC grouped Ebanga and Manyemen together in the negotia-
tions (as Ebanga–Manyemen). This was heavily contested by the people 
of Ebanga, exacerbating inter-village conflict. Ebanga claims to be an 
independent village, liberated from Manyemen in the 1970s and given 
the status of chiefdom. The people of Ebanga argue that they share a 
common boundary with Talangaye (to the south) and Manyemen (to the 
north), although the SGSOC land lease unifies them. This unification 
disadvantages Ebanga because it is smaller and its residents fear that they 
might not benefit substantially from the royalties that will be disbursed 
to the unified “Ebanga–Manyemen.” Ebanga prefers to exist as an inde-
pendent community and to receive its own royalties. Manyemen is 
against the separation, and prefers to remain united in order to obtain 
greater payments. A native of Ebanga, who resides in Manyemen, spoke 
against the union and argued that Ebanga could indeed be disadvan-
taged, although ultimately Ebanga might lose more land to the company. 
Another Ebanga farmer noted,  
Because Manyemen allocated land to SGSOC does not mean it 
should encroach [upon the] land of Ebanga people [….] Ebanga has 
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chiefdom just like Manyemen. Ebanga has not legally given land to 
SGSOC. We have complained to the director of SGSOC […] to no 
avail. We have contacted a lawyer to help us draft a letter of com-
plaint to the government. (5 June 2015) 
In addition, Ebanga is in conflict with Talangaye to the south because 
the latter has refused to recognise Ebanga as a neighbour. Some Ebanga 
residents are already accusing the village head of Talangaye of supporting 
the project, leading to the current land conflicts. 
Talangaye claims to share a boundary with Manyemen, which would 
entitle it to all land royalties as far as the border, subsuming Ebanga into 
its territory. One interviewee mentioned how the conflict became vocal 
at a meeting that took place on 22 May 2015 in Kumba. The territorial 
dispute was clearly linked to expected financial payments. 
These conflicts may seem mundane, but as Ribot and Peluso (2003) 
note, they can escalate with far-reaching socio-economic and cultural 
implications. First, there is the lack of trust on the part of villagers vis-à-
vis their leaders, as the former feel betrayed by the latter. Interviews and 
field observations revealed that communities no longer revere their 
chiefs, despite their position as representatives of the ancestors (see 
Mqeke 2003). Many respondents remained sceptical about whether their 
chiefs and elites might be able to offer them the support and protection 
they require. If SGSOC has paid some community members to serve as 
watchdogs against others, as they allege, then further distrust has been 
generated just as the oil palm frontier is advancing and communities 
need to be united.  
A second implication is the continued decline in sociocultural net-
works and enduring relationships. The chiefs of all three villages are 
believed to be descended from the same ancestor (Nguti Rural Council 
2009). As a result they occasionally feast together, symbolising unity and 
love for one another. During such gatherings, village elders deliberate the 
development of their region, but most importantly how to practise and 
promote culture. The authors were informed that, because of the grow-
ing lack of trust between village leaders, important sociocultural events 
like these have declined. 
Third, land is seen as an element of nature – for relating with one’s 
ancestors (Fisiy 1992; Sone 2012; Yanou 2009), and also as a resource to 
cater for basic economic necessities. The quest for royalties by the dif-
ferent villages and groups has reduced ancestral heritage to a mere com-
modity, as land is commodified to meet neoliberal market demands. 
Many participants argued that the loss of land, particularly sacred groves, 
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severs their connections with their ancestors. Some said that they are 
now unable to perform any rituals at all.  
The fourth implication is the alteration of village history to secure 
more land. Traditional village boundaries are increasingly being contested 
across the region. This is not new, but the authors were told that in the 
past, traditional conflict mechanisms would be deployed in gatherings of 
the chiefs and the council of elders, with the chiefs of other villages acting 
as mediators and peace-seekers. But today, villages in conflict are required 
to seek legal and administrative redress through local government authori-
ties. This is a relatively new development. And yet, conflict between these 
villages is not violent and has not yet escalated, because of the recognition 
that they all originate from the same ancestor, meaning there is a fear of 
ancestral retribution. A farmer commented, 
As farmers, we could feel the tension when we go into the forest to 
farm or to do hunting. Phrases such as “this bush is our bush” are 
common when we meet with another farmer or hunter in the forest.  
Such statements are sources of conflict, a respondent said, because in 
some instances, farmers end up quarrelling and retelling village histories. 
The stories are about asserting and then justifying rights to the same forest. 
As Sara Berry has noted, increasing struggles over tenure security have 
“followed myriad social fault lines, pitting national and local elites against 
ordinary citizens, neighbor against neighbor, kinsman against kinsman, and 
husbands against wives” (Berry 2002: 639). This is the situation in Nguti 
Subdivision today. 
Discussion  
The authors have shown how a poorly conceived and implemented LSLA 
project by Herakles Farms has generated competition over land and re-
sistance amongst communities in Nguti Subdivision. Contemporary land 
policies in Cameroon, which insist that land certificates are the only legal 
proof of land ownership, undermine the generations-old system of cus-
tomary tenure with which most rural communities are familiar. Foreign 
land investors like SGSOC take advantage of such policies to acquire large 
tracts of untitled land without the consent of local people and without 
making provisions for alternative livelihoods for the dispossessed (Ndi 
2017). The manner of land acquisition by SGSOC has attracted wide-
spread criticism in Cameroon and beyond, and it has been resisted by local 
populations (Fonjong et al. 2016; Ndi 2017).  
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The evidence presented here demonstrates the different dimensions 
of conflict instigated by the plantation project. It also shows how an 
unfriendly atmosphere of inward competition for, and outward contest-
ation of, claims to land threatens access to secure local livelihoods. The 
authors argued that, first, the top-down approach used to acquire land in 
Cameroon ignores or marginalises the voices and interests of those on 
the land, nourishing existing and new local conflicts. There is a form of 
“dispossession” of land and of livelihoods. In this case, seeking only the 
consent of a few influential people in affected communities violates the 
principle of FPIC that should be central to every large land acquisition. 
Furthermore, the inability of the agro-company to consult all (potential-
ly) affected villages (like Ebanga) explains the confusion that has arisen 
over boundaries and access to land, as well as the different types and 
forms of criticism these villagers levy against it.  
Second, the authors argued that dispossessed communities struggle 
inwardly with other neighbouring communities to acquire parcels of land 
for which royalties may be paid, and outwardly with the agro plantation 
company to contest encroachment into their forests. This dual form of 
resistance echoes Scott (1987) and Adnan (2007), in showing that con-
flict is perpetuated by unequal power relationships between actors. In 
addition, affected communities seek compensation for the destruction of 
crops, but lack the power to push their demands through.  
Villagers have been partially successful at resisting the alienation of 
land, but largely because the company has insufficient resources on the 
ground at present to occupy and extract full value from it, given its short 
period of tenure and an unclear business model. Herakles has not yet put 
all its land into continuous production. This has generated much uncer-
tainty, itself a basis for struggle over “access to livelihoods.”  
To guarantee rural livelihoods, peace and stability in this region, the 
conventional approach to large land acquisition – a transfer of “owner-
ship” to commercial interests in the expectation that rewards will trickle 
down to the local poor who are now dispossessed – needs to be revisited. 
Ideally, this would involve (1) proper consultation and rights of veto, and 
(2) adequate safeguarding of land that is most beneficial economically and 
socioculturally to local communities. Eliciting and reporting community 
concerns while also recognising socio-economic realities would lead to 
very different outcomes.  
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Conclusion 
The literature, through a growing number of case studies in Africa, 
demonstrates that top-down or corrupt land deals on the scale experienced 
in Southwest Cameroon will always generate some form of resistance. The 
authors have explored some of the complexities it has generated, with 
particular reference to cross-scale governance, inter-village disputes, and 
community resistance that has taken several different forms. While the 
obvious conclusion is that investors should ensure transparency, respect 
existing land and resources rights, and guarantee local food security (Cot-
ula et al. 2009; Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009), these calls have gen-
erally gone unheeded.  
In particular, the national government needs to institute laws that 
require local communities to approve all land transfers before any devel-
opment can take place (as in Mozambique and Tanzania; Vermeulen and 
Cotula 2010). While it is outside the scope of this article, many respond-
ents expressed an interest in greater commercial activity in which they 
can play a part in the future; there are cooperative palm oil processor 
operations elsewhere in the region that offer a way forward. This is, in 
part, a recognition that such a fertile and productive region is unlikely to 
remain isolated from commercial pressures for much longer. The inclu-
sion and participation of communities in investment projects through 
binding MoU is one way forward, as investor interest grows (Ndi 2017). 
The extent to which people will lend their support and effectively engage 
in palm oil and other agro-projects will depend on how much their pre-
sent and future needs, interests, and priorities are considered, whether 
through leaving customary rights intact or in terms of leases and conces-
sions. At present, local contestation prevails within communities and 
against major investors seeking further land deals. The land conflict 
across multiple levels of governance and across a large forested region 
persists because equitable access to land is being threatened in the con-
text of adverse tenure laws. This ultimately undermines the success of 
foreign investment in the region. Tropical Africa may be “rising,” but 
local voices cannot be ignored. 
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Land Grabbing und politische Konfliktlinien:  
Einsichten aus Südwestkamerun 
Zusammenfassung: Großflächiger Landerwerb (large-scale land acquisi-
tion, LSLA) durch ausländische Investoren ist ein Hauptmotor für Agrar-
wandel in den fruchtbaren Regionen des afrikanischen Kontinents. In den 
ländlichen Gebieten Südwestkameruns, in denen die gewohnten Formen 
der Landnutzung und des Zugangs zu Land durch kommerzielle Inte-
ressen bedroht sind, haben LSLA politische Konflikte ausgelöst. Die Au-
toren zeigen die Spannungen auf, die aus Versuchen entstehen, die Exis-
tenzbedingungen zu bewahren oder neu zu definieren, und zwar einerseits 
unter lokalen Wettbewerbern um Land und andererseits gegenüber An-
sprüchen externer Interessenten. In Nguti Subdivision, dem Schauplatz 
von Protesten gegen ein Agrarunternehmen, ist eine anhaltende Debatte 
über die ideelle Bedeutung von Land und die Interessen an Landnutzung 
und Landbesitz entstanden. Die Autoren zeigen auf, wie die bisherigen 
Landnutzer durch von oben autorisierte Landkäufe marginalisiert werden 
und wie daraus Konflikte zwischen Gemeinden und investierenden Unter-
nehmen entstehen. Sie kommen zu dem Schluss, dass erfolgreich und kon-
fliktfrei verlaufende Agrarprojekte nur dann möglich sind, wenn die Do-
minanz elitärer Interessen inklusiveren Prozessen weicht. 
Schlagwörter: Kamerun, Agrarstruktur, Grundbesitz, Land Grabbing, 
Bauern, Lebensbedingungen, Sozialer Konflikt 
 
